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I. Introduction 
In 2007 the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) saw its thirtieth anniversary.1 
Although its first twenty-five years were relatively quiet, the same cannot be said for its 
last five years. In the current post-Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) era, 2 the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have dramatically 
increased civil and criminal enforcement of the FCPA.3 Not only is the number of cases 
being bought by these agencies increasing, the DOJ is starting to utilize novel theories of 
liability to prevent corrupt corporations from avoiding prosecution.4 The increase in 
enforcement actions has been accompanied by record fines and intrusive settlement 
agreements.5 For example, in 2007, Baker Hughes Incorporated—a supplier of oil field 
equipment—signed agreements with the DOJ and SEC in which the company admitted 
paying over $4 million in bribes to officials of a state-owned oil company in 
                                                 
1Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78).  
2 For a review of the corporate scandals of 2001—including Enron, WorldCom, and others—and the 
legislative response of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,  see generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And it Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003). 
3 See Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action: Evaluating and Forecasting the 
Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM 
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285, 285 (2007) (noting that “the Department of Justice has initiated four times more 
prosecutions over the last five years than over the previous five years”); Danforth Newcomb,  FCPA Digest 
of Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977 (as of June 26, 2007) 2 (2007) available at http://www.shearman.com/publications (stating that 
“One of the most important recent trends in FCPA enforcement is the increased aggressiveness of 
government enforcement of the FCPA. Both the DOJ and the SEC have become increasingly aggressive in 
pursuing potential FCPA violations. ”) 
4 See Marceau, supra note 3, at 296-309 (describing ways the DOJ has expanded the reach of the FCPA 
through theories of liability applicable to parent companies, franchisors, successor companies, and others); 
John P. Giraudo, Charitable Contributions and the FCPA: Schering Plough and the Increasing Scope of 
SEC Enforcement, 61 BUS. LAWYER 135, 135-36 (2005) (discussing Schering Plough’s 2004 settlement 
with the SEC, which is the first time that an FCPA violation was based on charitable donations and 
demonstrates the SEC willingness to bring actions against parent companies for actions committed by a 
subsidiary without the knowledge of the parent). 
5 Newcomb, supra note 3, at 3. 
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Kazakhstan.6 As part of the agreements, Baker Hughes was required to pay over $44 
million in fines and penalties—the largest monetary sum to date with respect to FCPA 
violations—and retain an independent monitor to oversee its implementation of a 
compliance program.7 Similar settlements with independent monitor requirements were 
reached with other companies, such as Monsanto for bribing an Indonesian official to 
ease environmental regulatory requirements on its genetically modified agricultural 
products,8 Schnitzer Steel for its wholly-owned subsidiary paying bribes in China and 
Korea to induce purchases of scrap steel,9 and Micrus Corporation for paying bribes to 
doctors in Germany, Spain, France, and Turkey, to sell medical devices.10 
These enforcement developments are not without controversy. Some 
commentators question the harsh punishments imposed on corporations that have self-
disclosed violations of the FCPA and taken remedial actions. 11 Schnitzer Steel Industries, 
for example, discovered possible corrupt payments by its subsidiaries and then engaged 
in what the DOJ referred to as “exceptional cooperation” by disclosing the payments and 
                                                 
6 Department of Justice Press Release, Baker Hughes Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Bribing Kazakh Official 
and Agrees to Pay $11 Million Criminal Fine as Part of Largest Combined Sanction Ever Imposed in 
FCPA Case, April 7, 2007, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07_crm_296.html. In 
addition, the SEC complaint alleged that Baker Hughes violated provisions of the FCPA with its actions in 
Nigeria, Angola, Indonesia, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. SEC v. Baker Hughes Incorporated and 
Roy Fearnley, Civil Action No. H-07-1408, Litigation Release No. 20094,  April 26, 2007, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20094.htm. 
7 Department of Justice Press Release, Baker Hughes, supra note 6. 
8 Department of Justice Press Release, Monsanto Company Charged With Bribing Indonesian Government 
Official: Prosecution Deferred For Three Years, January 6, 2005, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/January/05_crm_008.htm. 
9 Department of Justice Press Release, Schnitzer Steel Industries Inc.’s Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Foreign 
Bribes and Agrees to Pay a $7.5 million fine, October 16, 2006, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pr/press_releases/2006/10/2006_4809_10-16-06schnitzerfraud.pdf. 
10 Department of Justice Press Release, Micrus Corporation Enters Into Agreement to Resolve Potential 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Liability, March 2, 2005, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/March/05_crm_090.htm. 
11 Michael Freedman, Trust Us: U.S. authorities say American and U.S.-listed companies that turn 
themselves in for overseas corruption will get leniency. If you believe that ..., Forbes, Dec. 25, 2006, at 132. 
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then taking actions to improve its compliance program.12 Despite these efforts, 
commentators complained that Schnitzer Steel received no real benefit from cooperation 
as the company was still required to pay large fines and had to enter a deferred 
prosecution agreement (DPA) with an independent monitor requirement.13 
In FCPA actions, as well as other criminal and regulatory matters,14 it is the 
growing use of DPAs that are creating the most controversy.15 In general, there are 
concerns of prosecutors abusing their powerful bargaining position to extract overly-
intrusive—and in some cases what are perceived as arbitrary—terms. 16 In addition, 
commentators bemoan the costs of implementing a compliance program that meets 
government demands and the required use of corporate monitors without clearly defined 
                                                 
12 Department of Justice Press Release, Schnitzer Steel, supra note 9. 
13 Freedman, supra 11, at 132. See generally Joan McPhee, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Ray of Hope 
or Guilty Plea by Another Name, 30 CHAMPION 12, 13-14 (2006) (arguing that DPAs are not always much 
of an improvement over a guilty plea, as the company may still be required to admit wrongdoing, the size 
of the fine may be the same, and the company often has to agree to highly intrusive government terms 
regarding compliance programs and corporate monitors). 
14 For our purposes, because FCPA violations are enforced by both the DOJ and the SEC, our discussion of 
DPAs also includes settlements with the SEC, which often contain similar terms with respect to the 
implementation of compliance programs and the use of corporate monitors. For an overview of SEC 
actions in this area, see generally Jennifer O’Hare, The Use of the Corporate Monitor in SEC Enforcement 
Actions, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 89 (2006). Although there are differences between the civil 
and criminal contexts, for purposes of this paper they are considered together. 
15 Under a deferred prosecution agreement, the prosecutor files an indictment against the corporation but 
agrees to defer prosecuting the charges if the corporation agrees to certain undertakings, such as admission 
of wrongdoing and rehabilitating itself through the implementation of a compliance program. Benjamin M. 
Greenblum, Note: What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1864 (2005). If at the end of the term of the agreement 
the prosecutor determines that the company has not breach the agreement, then the prosecutor will dismiss 
the indictment. Id. Nonprosecution agreements (NPAs) are very similar, with the main difference being that 
an indictment is not actually filed. Id. at 1872 n.60. For overviews of the use of DPAs and NPAs and their 
development over time, see generally, Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45 (2006). For an in-depth case study of Bristol-Myers Squibb’s DPA 
from the prosecutor’s perspective, see Christopher J. Christie & Robert M. Hanna, A Push Down The Road 
Of Good Corporate Citizenship: The Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between The U.S. Attorney For The 
District Of New Jersey And Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1043(2006). 
16 McPhee, supra note 13, at 14 (providing examples of DPA terms “requiring Bristol-Myers Squibb to 
endow a chair in business ethics at the law school from which the federal prosecutor received his law 
degree or requiring MCI WorldCom to "use good faith and reasonable commercial efforts" to add 1,600 
employees to its workforce in Oklahoma”). 
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powers that can potentially take actions that harm shareholder interests.17 Others, 
however, claim that DPAs are too lenient on corporations and result in “crime without 
conviction.”18 
This article takes a closer looker at the use of DPAs, and in particular, the use of 
corporate monitors in combating corruption. To understand the usefulness of this 
approach and suggest reforms to the process, this article situates the use of DPAs within 
the emerging category of regulation referred to as “New Governance” regulation. A key 
feature of this form of regulation is that the government agency sets policy goals, but then 
relies on the regulated entity to develop implementation techniques.19 The foundation of 
this approach is based on the recognition that effective regulation often requires the 
utilization of local knowledge to determine what works in that context.20  
The New Governance approach is necessary for combating corrupt payments by 
corporations because the root cause of the wrongful conduct is the corporation’s culture. 
One of the main problems in the FCPA context is the fit between the challenge presented, 
and the solutions available to prosecutors and enforcers.  Prosecutors and enforcers acting 
on their own have neither the resources nor the mandate to engage in the kind of large-
scale, ongoing interventions into corporations’ corporate governance, culture, policies, 
and procedures, that would be required to really address deep-seated corporate cultural 
                                                 
17 O’Hare, supra note 14, at 102-106; Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate 
Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1713, 1735-37 (2007). 
18 CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER, CRIME WITHOUT CONVICTION: THE RISE OF DEFERRED AND NON-
PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, December 28, 2005, available at: 
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/deferredreport.htm; see also Brandon Garrett, Structural Reform 
Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 856 (2007) (quoting Ralph Nader’s comments that through the use of 
DPAs the DOJ is derogating their duty to seek justice).  
19 Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
2073, 2108 (2005) 
20 Id. at 2107-2108. See infra Part III.A. 
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pathologies.  Yet the prosecutor’s most available and common recourse, deterrence 
through monetary fines, has considerable limitations as a tool for effecting corporate 
cultural change.  Even if prosecuting the hard FCPA cases were easier and more common 
than it is, deterrence in the form of monetary fines can only be a partial response.  
Monetary penalties do not address intractable problems of institutional culture except in 
the most accidental way. Although monetary penalties may deter companies from 
engaging in open and obviously law-violating conduct, such penalties are unpredictable 
as tools for effecting large scale reform of organizational culture. Encouraging firms to 
appear law-abiding, such as through the use of “cosmetic” compliance programs or 
“calculated” cooperation with the government, is not the same as encouraging firms to 
actually be law-abiding, particularly in the face of collective action problems and the 
perceived “business necessity” of engaging in bribery in certain countries. 
Fostering responsible self-regulation is another important response to the 
challenge of curbing corrupt practices.  Broader societal pressures and the so-called 
“license to operate” may even be more important than regulatory action in encouraging 
corporate compliance with law.21  The majority of corporations tend to be law-abiding 
not only because the law requires it, but because they believe that the underlying legal 
requirements are legitimate and that compliance carries rewards within their broader 
communities.  However, voluntary self-regulation is insufficient on its own.  There is the 
obvious problem that many corporate managers believe that they “need” to pay bribes to 
remain competitive or even to conduct business at all in some countries.  In addition, 
                                                 
21 See Neil Gunningham et al.,  Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond 
Compliance, 29 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 307, 329-39 (2004) (developing the idea of a “license to operate” 
which consists of social, economic, and legal demands on the firm). 
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many shareholders may put little pressure on corporations to end corruption, especially 
since the negative externalities associated with corruption are not primarily borne within 
the United States.22 
This article develops a New Governance approach to combating corporate 
corruption that straddles the divide between self-regulation and traditional, command-
and-control regulation. This approach involves the use of Reform Undertakings in 
settlement agreements with the SEC or DPAs with the DOJ. The Reform Undertaking is 
a novel remedial form that has emerged in securities law enforcement over the last few 
years.23 A primary feature of this approach is the corporation’s agreement to retain an 
independent monitor that has direct obligations to the government agency. This article 
argues that when implemented in a transparent and participatory manner by a suitably 
qualified Third Party, and when augmented by centralized learning, the Reform 
Undertaking is the best available mechanism for grappling with difficult problems of 
organizational culture. Reform Undertakings, and the use of DPAs in general, are a 
growing and controversial practice, but they have not yet received significant scrutiny by 
legal scholars. Although the particular focus of this article in on combating corruption, 
the insights gained from this article’s use of a New Governance perspective are 
applicable to the use of DPAs generally, and to the use of corporate monitors by the DOJ 
and SEC in other settings. 
                                                 
22 However, investors taking a longer-term should realize that both grand and petty corruption “reduce 
profits and skew competition.” David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Taking Responsibility for Bribery: The 
Multinational Corporation’s Role in Combating Corruption, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DILEMMAS 
AND SOLUTIONS 260, 268 (Rory Sullivan ed., 2003) [hereinafter Hess & Dunfee, Taking Responsibility]. In 
addition, public awareness of a firm’s payment of bribes may have a negative impact on a corporation’s 
reputation (Id. at 268-69) and relatedly, as mentioned earlier, its broader, socially-constructed “license to 
operate.” See generally Gunningham et al., supra note 21. 
23 See Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 797-
802 (2005) 
 7 
This article proceeds by Part II reviewing the extent and nature of corruption that 
continues to exist in international business. This Part also explains how corrupt practices 
can be rooted in a corporation’s culture, and thus persist despite external regulatory 
efforts to end bribery. Part III provides an overview of New Governance regulation and 
then assesses the use of compliance programs under the organizational sentencing 
guidelines as a form of New Governance regulation and finds some significant shortfalls. 
Next, Part IV further develops the idea of a Reform Undertaking and identifies the 
necessary requirements for this approach to be an effective tool in combating corporate 
corruption. Part V concludes. 
 
II. The Continuing Problem of Corruption 
A. The Paradox of Corruption 
Corruption is universally disapproved yet universally prevalent.24 This paradox of 
corruption is as true today as it has ever been. Although international efforts to combat 
corruption continue to evolve and draw strong public support, the payment of bribes by 
corporations continues as a common business practice. For example, a KPMG survey 
conducted in 2005 and 2006 found that eleven percent of employees working in 
regulatory affairs functions for their organizations observed others “making improper 
payments or bribes to foreign officials.”25 A survey by Control Risks Group Limited 
                                                 
24 David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach: The C2 Principles 
(Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 593, 595 (2000) [hereinafter Hess & Dunfee, Fighting 
Corruption]. 
25 KPMG FORENSIC, INTEGRITY SURVEY 2005–2006, at 5 (2006), available at 
http://www.kpmginsiders.com/pdf/050362_ForIntegritySurvNEW.pdf. The survey “asked employees 
whether they had ‘personally seen’ or had ‘firsthand knowledge of’ misconduct within their organizations 
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found that thirty-two percent of United States executive respondents believed that their 
competitors from the United States “regularly” or “nearly always” used local agents as a 
way to attempt to circumvent anti-bribery laws.26 
There is even evidence to suggest that the prevalence of bribery is actually 
increasing in the post-SOX era of increasing attention to matters of corporate integrity 
and accountability. The Control Risks Group survey found that more United States-based 
corporations believed that they failed to win a contract due to a competitor paying a bribe 
in 2006 than they did four years earlier.27 Overall, in 2006, forty-four percent of 
managers believed they lost a contract due to bribery in the last 5 years (twenty percent in 
the last 12 months).28 These managers are not optimistic that these trends will reverse any 
time soon, as eighty-two percent of respondents believed that corruption would increase, 
or at least stay the same, over the next five years.29 
B. The Limits of Deterring Corruption through Enforcement  
The United States was the global leader in the fight against corruption in 
international business by passing the FCPA in 1977,30 but United States-based 
                                                                                                                                                 
over the prior 12-month period.” Id. at 2. The survey results were based on 4,056 respondents from 11 
different industries. Id. 
26 CONTROL RISKS GROUP LIMITED AND SIMMONS & SIMMONS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ATTITUDES TO 
CORRUPTION - SURVEY 2006, at 12-13 (2006), available at 
www.crg.com/PDF/corruption_survey_2006_V3.pdf. An additional 44% indicated that they believed their 
competitors did so “occasionally.” Id. at 13. 
27  Controls Risks, supra note 27, at 5. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 21 (finding that 28% of managers believed that corruption would increase, 54% believed it would 
stay the same, 12% predicted a decrease, and the remaining 6% were undecided). 
30 The FCPA provisions can be divided into two categories. First, corporations are prohibited from bribing 
foreign officials. Marika Maris & Erika Singer, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 575, 
578 & 582-90(2006). Second, corporations must meet certain accounting practices requirements with 
respect to adequate internal controls and accurate record keeping. Id. at 579-81. 
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corporations continue to pay bribes at the same rate as corporations from other developed 
countries. Based on Transparency International’s31 2006 Bribe Payers Index—which 
ranks countries based on the propensity of their corporations to pay bribes when 
conducting business abroad32—the United States tied for ninth amongst the thirty leading 
exporting countries.33 Although a cluster analysis of the data that divided the countries 
into four groups placed the United States in top group,34 Transparency International 
makes a point not to congratulate these countries, and states “companies from all 
countries in the survey show a considerable propensity to pay bribes.”35 
There are several factors contributing to the failure of the FCPA to significantly 
restrict the payment of bribes by United States companies. First, although the DOJ and 
SEC have increased enforcement of the FCPA in the past few years,36 it may still be 
insufficient to create much of a deterrent effect. A recent review of all cases prosecuted 
under the FCPA concludes that the Act is significantly under-enforced and that a large 
share of the convictions consisted of “easy” cases that resulted from such actions as 
                                                 
31 Transparency International is one of the most well-known civil society organizations that are devoted to 
combating corruption in all its forms. Their website is located at: http://www.transparency.org.  
32 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, BRIBE PAYERS INDEX (BPI): ANALYSIS 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2006/bpi_2006. The rankings are based on an 
anonymous survey of 11,232 executives from 125 countries. Id. After these executives select the nation of 
origin of the companies doing the most business in their country, they are asked to answer the following 
question by ranking the countries on a scale from “bribes are common” to “bribes never occur”: “In your 
experience, to what extent do firms from the countries you have selected make undocumented extra 
payments or bribes?” Id.  
33 Id. at 4. 
34 The members of this group (in order from least likely to pay bribes to most likely) were: Switzerland, 
Sweden, Australia, Austria, Canada, UK, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, US, and Japan. Id. at 5. 
35 Id. at 5. In fact, the press release accompanying the publication of the 2006 Bribe Payers Index is 
contains the subheading “Foreign bribery by emerging export powers ‘disconcertingly high.’” 
Transparency International, Press Release, available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/bpi/bpi_2006#pr.  
36 See supra notes 3-5 (noting the recent increase in FCPA enforcement actions and the record fines 
imposed). 
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corporations self-reporting the violations.37 In addition, many convictions relied on 
actions that the corporation could have easily disguised to avoid detection, which 
suggests that more careful firms are able to make similar payments without significant 
fear of prosecution.38 Overall, due to the DOJ’s inability to demonstrate that it can obtain 
convictions on cases of corruption involving complex flows of money—the “hard” 
cases—corporations can continue to pay bribes with little fear of prosecution.39 
Even though the FCPA may not provide much of a deterrent effect, it also serves 
an expressive function that tells managers that corrupt payments are immoral. In the face 
of strong economic pressures to either pay the bribe or lose business, however, moral 
suasion is not sufficient and many firms give in and pay the bribe out of a belief that it is 
a business necessity.40 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that other major exporting 
countries are not enforcing their anti-corruption laws.41 If other countries are not 
enforcing their anti-corruption laws against their home corporations, then United States 
corporations continue to feel that paying bribes is a business necessity in some situations. 
In other words, all major exporting countries must enforce their anti-bribery laws to 
ensure that all multinational corporations are competing on a level playing field and feel 
less pressure to pay bribes. 
                                                 
37 Philip Segal, Coming Clean on Dirty Dealing: Time for a Fact-Based Evaluation of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 18 FLA. J. OF INT’L. L. 169, 171-75 (2006). 
38 Id. at 175, 189-95 (reviewing eleven convictions under the FCPA and showing how the corporation in 
each case could have easily avoided, or significantly reduced, the likelihood of detection). 
39 Id. at 195-96. 
40 See RONALD E. BERENBEIM, CONFERENCE BOARD RESEARCH REPORT, RESISTING CORRUPTION: HOW 
COMPANY PROGRAMS ARE CHANGING 9 (2006) (noting that of the 20 executives participating in a webcast 
conference, 85% believed that the FCPA failed to deter bribery in many cases due to a belief that there is a 
necessity of paying bribes in some countries). 
41 See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (providing data on international enforcement trends). 
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A recent review of enforcement of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions by Transparency 
International presents some points of optimism that international enforcement is 
improving, but a closer look reveals that there are many reasons to believe that 
prosecution is not a significant deterrent. As for points of optimism, fourteen of thirty-
four signatory countries show signs of enforcement as demonstrated by significant cases 
of prosecution or investigations.42 However, eighteen countries have not prosecuted any 
companies or individuals for corruption,43 and in both 2006 and 2007, the United States 
brought more prosecutions than the other thirty-three countries combined.44 Furthermore, 
despite the increases in enforcement and international efforts to publicize new laws on 
corruption, many managers remain ignorant of their existence. One survey found that 
forty-two percent of executives of United States companies with international operations 
were “totally ignorant” on the laws covering bribery.45 Executives of corporations from 
such major exporting nations as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, were even 
more likely to claim total ignorance.46 
 
                                                 
42 FRITZ HEIMANN AND GILLIAN DELL,  TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, PROGRESS REPORT 07: 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS 6 
(2007), available at http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2007/oecd. 
43 Id at 6. 
44 Id. at 5 (calculated from the data on prosecutions). To get a sense of the involvement of a country’s 
corporations in international business, it is useful to note that the US accounts for 9.99% of world exports 
in 2006, compared to 56.87% for the other 33 countries. Id. 
45 Control Risks, supra note 27, at 10. This study was based on telephone interviews conducted in July 
2006  of 50 high level executives (the respondents were described as “senior decision-makers at or near 
board level”) from each Brazil, France, Germany, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States, for a total of 350 interviews. Id. at 22.  
46 Id. at 10. 
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C. Solving the Problem of Corruption 
Solving the problem of corruption requires that it be attacked simultaneously with 
a variety of approaches addressing different causes of the problem.47 These approaches 
must seek to reduce the demand for bribes (the public officials receiving the bribes) as 
well as restrict the supply (the corporations paying the bribes). This article focuses only 
on the supply-side. Though, it is important to remember that the anti-corruption efforts of 
multinational corporations can assist in deinstitutionalizing established norms of 
corruption in the host country and thereby also reduce the demand for bribes.48 
There are multiple mechanisms available to reduce the supply of bribes. 
Increasing enforcement of existing criminal laws—in both the United States and 
internationally—can help provide a deterrent, as well as help level the playing field 
which also serves to reduce the pressure to pay a bribe to win business. As discussed 
above, enforcement has been limited and is not a complete solution to the problem.49 
Some commentators argue that the deterrent effect of criminal enforcement can be 
bolstered by encouraging corporations that lose contracts due to a corrupt payment to sue 
the bribe-paying corporation for civil damages.50 In the past, there has been an 
                                                 
47 Thomas W. Dunfee & David Hess, Getting from Salbu to the "Tipping Point": The Role of Corporate 
Action Within a Portfolio of Anti-Corruption Strategies, 21 NW. J. INT"L L. & BUS. 471, 472-73 (2001). 
48 See Chuck C.Y. Kwok and Solomon Tadesse, The MNC as an agent of change for host-country 
institutions: FDI and corruption, 37 J. OF INT’L BUS. STUDIES 767 (2006) (providing an empirical analysis 
that supports the potential positive influence of multinational corporations). 
49 See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text. 
50 Ethan S. Burger & Mary S. Holland, Why the Private Sector is Likely to Lead the Next Stage in the 
Global Fight Against Corruption, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 45, 63-68 (2006) (reviewing cases filed in US 
courts of corporations seeking damages against corporations alleged to have paid bribes to win contracts) 
and 72-73 (arguing in favor of a strong plaintiff’s bar for bringing civil lawsuits on the basis of corrupt 
payments). 
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experiment with an international panel to hear complaints of competitors paying bribes, 
but this approach ultimately proved unsuccessful.51 
Finding ways to encourage effective self-regulation is also a necessity. A 
voluntary corporate principles approach seeks, in part, to encourage multinational 
corporations to band together in their promise and efforts not to pay bribes.52 Such 
initiatives are part of a larger focus on corporate social responsibility more generally. For 
example, the United Nation’s Global Compact is a set of ten principles on core values 
that all corporations should support, including working against corruption in any form.53 
The FTSE4Good, a leading equity index of socially responsible firms,54 has recently 
established anti-bribery criteria that firms must meet in order to stay in the index.55   
As a necessary addition to these various approaches, this article develops the idea 
of self-regulation through the lens of New Governance regulation. For this purpose, it is 
                                                 
51 Stuart Marc Weiser, Dealing with Corruption: Effectiveness of Existing Regimes on Doing Business, 91 
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 99, 99-101 (1997) (presenting the comments of Francois Vincke). The panel was 
established by the International Chamber of Commerce, but failed to have any impact on business behavior. 
Id. at 100-101. 
52 See Hess & Dunfee, Fighting Corruption, supra note 24 (outlining a corporate principles approach to 
combating corruption); Hess & Dunfee, Taking Responsibility, supra note 22, at 263-64 (Rory Sullivan ed., 
2003) (reviewing corporate principles approaches supported by the Caux Round Table, Social 
Accountability International, and Transparency International). 
53 UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, TEN PRINCIPLES, available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html. The 10th principle states that 
“Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.” Id. For a 
critique of the Global Compact and how it fits into discussions of corporate social responsibility, see 
generally Justine Nolan, The United Nation’s Compact with Business: Hindering or Helping the Protection 
of Human Rights, 24 U. QUEENSLAND L. J. 445 (2005); Oliver F. Williams, The UN Global Compact: The 
Challenge and the Promise, 14 BUS. ETHICS Q. 755 (2004). 
54 See Oliver Balch, Raising the Bar of Performance, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at 7.  
55 Firms must meet bribery criteria for FTSE4Good, SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT, March 16, 2006, at 9. The 
criteria went into effect in July 2006 for firms in industries that are at high risk for paying bribes, and 
January 2007 for all other firms. Id. Details on the criteria can be found at FTSE4Good, Countering Bribery 
Criteria (Feb. 2006) available at 
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/Downloads/FTSE4Good_Countering_Bribery_Cri
teria_Feb_06.pdf. 
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important to recognize that corruption is not unlike other problems of wrongdoing 
committed by organizations, such as fraud, discrimination, or violations of environmental 
regulations. In all cases, wrongdoing is not simply a matter of corporations being 
“rational profit maximizers” that make compliance decisions based on a cost-benefit 
calculation that takes into account the benefits of noncompliance versus the severity of 
potential penalties discounted by the chances of being caught.56 Instead, wrongdoing can 
become embedded in organizational polices, practices, and perceptions. Thus, any 
regulatory approach that seeks to combat corruption must find ways to improve the 
ethical culture of corporations engaged in bribery. Reform Undertakings are a necessary 
tool in this endeavor. The goal, then, of Reform Undertakings is to encourage 
corporations to improve their cultures and to develop a better understanding of how those 
improvements are accomplished for purposes of developing best practices to be used 
throughout the industry. The next section shows why the issue of corporate culture must 
be addressed when attempting to combat corruption. 
 
D. Why FCPA Enforcement Must Focus on Issues of Corporate Culture 
Combating the supply-side of corruption will not be successful without taking 
steps to ensure that corporations are developing cultures that are supportive of the effort 
to end corrupt payments. To illustrate, consider again this article’s opening case of Baker 
Hughes Inc. This company, headquartered in Houston, Texas, provides oil field services 
throughout the world. In 2001, the SEC issued a cease-and-desist order claiming that the 
company made improper payments to an Indonesian official and that the company made 
                                                 
56 Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm¸76 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 453-55 (2003). 
 15 
payments in Brazil and India without assuring itself that the payments would not 
ultimately be used for bribes. In addition, the SEC alleged that the company did not 
properly record the payments and instead listed them as ordinary business expenses.57 As 
part of the cease-and-desist order, Baker Hughes was required to develop internal 
accounting controls to prevent improper payments in the future.58 In 2007, however, the 
SEC filed a compliant against Baker Hughes alleging that for several years after the date 
of the cease-and-desist order the company continued to make payments in such countries 
as Nigeria, Angola, Indonesia, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, without adequately 
assuring itself that these payments were not going to government officials.59 As part of its 
deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ, Baker Hughes admitted to paying bribes in 
Kazakhstan until at least November 2003.60  
Can a few rouge employees be blamed for these numerous acts involving the 
payment of bribes and employees actively attempting to avoid direct knowledge of 
whether a payment will be used by an agent to pay a bribe? Will installing a better 
internal control system end these practices? Can the improper payments be explained 
simply by blaming leadership for not doing a better job of monitoring and supervising 
subordinates?61 Business ethics researchers and other social scientists studying 
                                                 
57  In the Matter of Baker Hughes Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 44784 (Sept. 12, 2001), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-44784.htm 
58 Id. 
59 SEC v. Baker Hughes Incorporated and Roy Fearnley, Civil Action No. H-07-1408, Litigation Release 
No. 20094,  April 26, 2007, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20094.htm 
60  US v. Baker Hughes Incorporated, Deferred Prosecution Agreement filed in the US District Court for 
the Southern District of Texas, April 11, 2007, at Attachment A, pp. 10-13 (copy on file with authors). 
61 See Susanne C. Monahan and Beth A. Quinn, Beyond ‘Bad Apples’ and ‘Weak Leaders’: Toward a Neo-
Institutional Explanation of Organizational Deviance, 10 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 361, 361-62 (2006) 
(stating that commentators often attempt to explain deviant behavior within organizations by blaming 
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organizations know that the answer to all these questions is “no.”62 Corrupt practices can 
become so ingrained in how a corporation conducts its daily activities that simply adding 
more controls or increasing monitoring activity have only limited effectiveness because 
they do not address the root of the problem: the corporation’s culture. 
Encouragingly, the importance of addressing the problem of corporate culture is 
gaining greater recognition in the law. As discussed further below, the 2004 amendments 
to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines updated the requirements of an “effective” 
compliance program for organizations to receive a mitigated sentence. In addition to 
updating the structural characteristics requirements of the original 1991 Guidelines (e.g., 
anonymous reporting mechanisms, training programs), the amendments stated that 
corporations must also “promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical 
conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law.”63 Likewise, the DOJ views the 
decision to indict a corporation as a potential tool to improve corporate cultures,64 and 
considers a corporation’s existing culture when making the decision of whether or not to 
indict a corporation.65 
                                                                                                                                                 
individual “bad apples,” explicit orders from leadership for subordinates to commit the wrongful act, or the 
failure of leadership to monitor and supervise employees). 
62 Id. at 362 (stating that explanations that focus only on individual failure downplay the importance of the 
organizational environment); see also Trevino et al., Behavior Ethics in Organizations: A Review, 32 J. 
MGMT. 951, 966-68 (2006) (reviewing empirical studies on the influence of organizational culture on 
individuals’ ethical behavior). 
63  § 8B2.1(a)(2) 
64  Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, Memorandum to Heads of Department Components & 
United States Attorney, Dec. 12, 2006, at 2 (copy on file with author) (stating that “Indicting corporations 
for wrongdoing enables the government to address and be a force for positive change of corporate culture. . 
. .”) 
65 Id. at 6 (stating that a corporation’s “history of similar conduct may be probative of a corporate culture 
that encouraged, or at least condoned, such conduct, regardless of any compliance programs.”) 
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The following subsections take a closer look at how corporate culture can 
influence employees’ use of improper payments. This discussion provides a foundation 
for understanding the role of the law in improving corporate culture. 
1. Combating Corrupt Corporate Cultures: Understanding 
Individual Rationalizations 
To understand how the law can help corporations develop cultures that do not 
condone, or unintentionally promote the use of, corrupt payments, it is useful to first look 
at the individuals, and then take a step back to see how the organization influences 
individual behavior. For individuals within corporations, the concern is that otherwise 
ethical employees pay bribes—or ignore obvious warning signs that the corporation’s 
agents are paying bribes—by rationalizing their behavior. 66 There are several different 
ways that employees rationalize corrupt behavior. First, employees may take an action 
they know is wrong by denying any responsibility for those actions. They do this by 
claiming that they have no alternative but to pay a bribe.67 Employees rationalize this 
behavior by claiming that they are trapped in a problem that is not of their creation (and 
                                                 
66 Vikas Anand et al., Business as Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation of Corruption in 
Organizations, 19 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 9, 10-14 (2004). Rationalizations allow individuals “to neutralize 
their negative feelings or regrets about their behavior.” Id. at 10. Although the authors use the word 
“corruption” in their article, they are using the word to refer to general wrongdoing and not simply the 
payment of bribes. Of course, it is important to recognize that the payment of bribes or the avoidance of 
conducting due diligence so that one can attempt to avoid direct knowledge that payments to an agent are 
being used for bribes are not unlike other types of corporate wrongdoings, whether it is price-fixing, 
securities fraud, or violations of environmental regulations.  
67 See Id. at 11-12. As reported in the SEC complaint against Baker Hughes Inc., once the company was 
informed that it must pay a bribe in order to win a contract, company managers complained that the 
payments were “distasteful” but agreed to pay anyway because they were necessary. SEC v. Baker Hughes 
Incorporated and Ray Fearnley, Complaint, US District Court for the Southern District of Texas, April 26, 
2007, at 11-12, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20094.pdf. One 
subcontractor consented to making the payment and stated in an email “Our response to the question is do 
we have any option?” Id. at 11.  
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is perhaps a long-standing “tradition” in that country), thus they do not have to take moral 
responsibility for doing what they know is wrong.  
Employees may also deny that anyone is being injured by their conduct.68 
Because there is a belief that no one is being harmed and the members of the organization 
are benefiting through the new business, employees do not feel bad about paying a 
bribe.69 The harms caused by bribery involve long-term impacts on a country’s economic 
development, the performance of vital functions by the government, and citizens’ 
realization of essential human rights.70 With their perceptions filtered by their short-term 
economic demands, employees may have a difficult time seeing how their actions make 
these problems worse in any appreciable way, or how their refusal to pay a bribe in this 
situation will make a difference for the better (especially considering that if they do not 
pay the bribe, a competitor likely will). 
Moreover, euphemistic labeling71 makes it easier for employees to avoid seeing 
the harm. Employees pay “facilitation payments”—which, because they are explicitly 
allowed by the FCPA, further muddies the moral problem of corruption—rather than 
bribes. Not gaining appropriate assurances that an agent is not using the corporation’s 
payments for bribes is viewed as a “failure to conduct due diligence,” which hides the 
moral nature of the problem. In addition, many view an omission to act that causes harm 
                                                 
68 See Anand et al., supra note 66, at 12-13. 
69 See Id. at 13. 
70 Hess & Dunfee, Taking Responsibility, supra note 22, at 261-62; Hess & Dunfee, Fighting Corruption, 
supra note 24, at 596-97; Vito Tanzi, Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and 
Cures, 45 IMF STAFF PAPERS 559, 582-86 (1998). 
71 See Arthur P. Brief et al., Collective corruption in the corporate world: Toward a process model, in 
GROUPS AT WORK: THEORY AND Research 471, 485 (Marlene E. Turner, ed., 2001); see also Ann E. 
Tenbrunsel and David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 
SOCIAL JUSTICE RESEARCH 223, 226-228 (2004) (discussing language euphemisms and unethical behavior 
in organizations). 
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as less ethically wrong than an affirmative action that causes harm.72 Thus, employees 
may view ignoring red flags and failing to conduct due diligence on an agent as morally 
unproblematic, even though they would have problems with affirmatively authorizing the 
payment of a bribe. This is compounded by the fact that employees will likely feel greater 
loyalties to their team within the organization than to society generally73 and therefore 
pay bribes that provide a short-term benefit to the team at the expense of perpetuating a 
cycle of corruption.  
Some employees may actually feel that they are doing the right thing for society 
by paying a bribe. Consider the ethical dilemma set out by Berenbeim:  
Suppose, for example, you were a project manager bidding on a local 
governmental contract to build a bridge. You know that a bribe is 
necessary for your proposal to even receive serious consideration. Other 
companies that you believe do inferior work will not hesitate to pay the 
bribe. Should you sacrifice the lives and safety of a country's innocent 
citizens because of your company's unwillingness to accede to deeply 
ingrained cultural and political practices? No act of yours will put an end 
to this practice; the only consequence will be death and injury to those 
who use the bridge.74 
                                                 
72 David M. Messick and Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of Decision Making, 
SLOAN MGMT. REV., Winter 1996, at 9, 15. 
73 See Anand et al., supra note 66, at 13. 
74 Ron Berenbeim, Cutting off the supply side of bribes: being against corruption is more difficult than you 
think, VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, April 15, 1999, at 408, 409. 
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Many employees will rationalize their behavior through such a line of analysis.75 
Finally, because FCPA violations are apparently rarely enforced compared to the 
actual number of violations (or at least perceived violations),76 then individuals may 
begin to challenge the legitimacy of the law as it is being applied and therefore not see 
noncompliance as unethical.77 Arbitrary and unfair (as perceived by employees) 
enforcement of the FCPA, and other countries’ anti-corruption laws, raise issues of 
fairness. As established by Tom Tyler’s work in social-psychology, individuals feel less 
of a moral obligation to follow a law that is applied unfairly.78  
Overall, employees can easily find rationalizations to take actions that are against 
the company’s code of conduct or the law. The fault, however, does not lie just with (or 
even primarily with) the individuals. Organizations with unethical cultures push 
employees to use these rationalizations where they otherwise would not. The 
                                                 
75  Berenbeim challenges a manager that believes paying a bribe in that situation is justified by asking: 
“How can the manager be certain that his company's bridge is sufficiently superior to justify the bribe? If 
we allow the justification for bridge bidding, what others must we also permit? Should those who believe 
themselves to be purveyors of other higher quality, lower cost products be allowed similar flexibility?” Id. 
at 409. Berenbeim hopes that those questions will cause a manager to doubt their practices, however, those 
questions also demonstrate how easy it is for a manager to fall prey to this rationalization. That is, any 
manager that rightly or wrongly believes that they have a higher quality product than their competitors may 
use this justification. 
76 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (discussing enforcement trends). 
77 See Anand et al., supra note 66, at 13. The same would apply to a company’s provisions on the payment 
of bribes in its code of conduct. Prohibiting the payment of bribes is not as simple as those unfamiliar to the 
area may believe. Two challenging areas are the use of facilitation payments and business courtesies, which 
includes small gifts, travel expenses, and entertainment expenses. Dunfee & Hess, supra note 47, at 476-80.  
These payments are allowed by the FCPA, but at some point they can cross the line and become bribes. Id.  
Attempting to distinguish when a manager or agent has crossed that line is extremely difficult and depends 
on local laws and customs. Id. Thus, what one manager’s company considers an improper payment may be 
allowed by a competitor. Or, even within one company, similar payments but in different contexts may be 
treated differently by the company. To some employees, the distinctions may seem arbitrary and unfair. In 
addition, the allowance of facilitation payments and business courtesies can place managers on a slippery 
slope, where they continually push the boundaries of what is an acceptable payment until they have crossed 
the line without even being fully aware of the ethical and legal issues involved.  Tenbrunsel and Messick, 
supra note 71, at 228-29. 
78 See generally, TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). 
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organization’s socialization process, social norms, and incentive systems, can all work to 
encourage employees to rationalize their actions and believe the corrupt practices are 
“business as usual.”79 Of course, organizational culture can also support the ethical values 
that make employees more likely to refuse to pay or authorize bribes and work to prevent 
those around them from engaging in corrupt acts. The next section takes a closer look at 
how corporate cultures can encourage wrongful conduct by employees. 
2. Combating Corrupt Corporate Cultures: Understanding 
Organizations’ Social Architecture 
To understand how corporate cultures function and evolve over time, it is useful 
to distinguish between a corporation’s “hardware” and its “software.” 80 A corporation’s 
hardware includes its formal structure, policies, and processes.81 Software refers to the 
informal norms of behavior within the organization,82 which includes the ethical culture 
and ethical climate of the firm.83 With respect to combating corruption, the corporation’s 
hardware includes its code of conduct, FCPA compliance program, and internal 
accounting controls. How those formal processes work in practice, however, depends on 
                                                 
79 Anand et al., supra note 66, at 10-11. 
80 David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1806 (2007). 
81 Id. at  1806.  
82 Id. at 1806. 
83   For purposes of this paper, we will use the term ethical culture to include the firm’s ethical climate. A 
firm’s ethical climate refers to employees’ perceptions of organizational practices that have ethical content. 
Linda Klebe Treviño et al., The Ethical Context in Organizations: Influences on Employee Attitudes and 
Behaviors, 8 BUS. ETHICS Q. 447, 448-50 (1998). The firm’s culture refers to the informal and formal 
systems of behavioral controls within the organization. Id. at 451-52. Ethical climate and ethical culture are 
viewed as being strongly related. Id. at 474; see also Daniel R. Denison, What’ the Difference Between 
Organizational Culture and Organizational Climate? A Native’s Point of View on a Decade of Paradigm 
Wars, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 619, 645 (1996) (arguing that scholars studying organizational climate and 
organizational culture are not making clear distinctions between the two, and that climate versus culture is 
more a matter of “differences in interpretation rather than differences in the phenomenon” [emphasis in 
original]). 
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a firm’s software. Thus, enforcement actions that simply require corporations to adopt a 
compliance program and adequate internal controls will often not be enough. Although 
these organizational hardware policies are necessary, they are not sufficient. Social norms 
within the organization can easily render compliance program requirements meaningless. 
As one example, consider the use of employee hotlines. This is a tool to allow 
employees to anonymously report unethical or illegal behavior they have observed to 
upper management. These hotlines are considered a vital part of an effective anti-bribery 
compliance program.84 To function as desired, however, hotlines must be supported by 
the organization’s software, which requires leadership to actively manage the process. 
Employees will not use the hotlines if they believe that they will face some form of 
retaliation (a fear that exists even with anonymous reporting) or that the organizational 
will not take action to correct the problem they report.85 To create an organizational 
culture that supports reporting wrongdoing, management must actually show employees 
that there is no retaliation for any reports filed and that all reports will be fully 
investigated and dealt with appropriately.  DuPont, for example, does this by distributing 
“Business Ethics Bulletins” to its employees that describe wrongdoing within the 
organization, how the wrongdoer was punished, and how the transgression came to the 
attention of management.86 Without these extra efforts, upper management should not 
                                                 
84 Berenbeim, supra note 40, at 23. 
85 A recent survey by the Ethics Resource Center supports this. Of respondents witnessing misconduct of 
any form, almost one-half did not report the misconduct. ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, NATIONAL BUSINESS 
ETHICS SURVEY: HOW EMPLOYEE VIEW ETHICS IN THEIR ORGANIZATIONS 1994–2005, at 28  (2005) 
[hereinafter NBES]. When asked what factors influenced their decision not to report the acts, 59% stated 
that they did not believe the company would take corrective action, 46% stated a fear of retaliation, and 
39% doubted that their report would really remain anonymous. Id. 
86 Andrew Singer, DuPont’s Daring Communications Formula, ETHIKOS & CORPORATE CONDUCT Q., 
January/February 2004, at 1, 1-2. 
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have confidence that this piece of organizational hardware will have any impact on 
reducing the payment of bribes. 
If management does not attend to the software of the organization, then other 
aspects of the organization’s hardware can end up having unintended, negative 
consequences that contribute to the routinization of corruption within the corporation. 
Over a period of time, wrongdoing, including the payment of bribes and the failure of 
employees to heed warning signs that an agent of the corporation is paying bribes, can 
become institutionalized into the culture of the organization.87 This occurs through a 
process where the leadership of the organization condones or encourages the wrongful 
behavior (either explicitly or implicitly), employees choose to engage in the behavior, 
and then, over a period of time, the wrongful actions become routine.88 The starting point 
of this process can be the intentional as well as unintentional acts of leadership 
throughout the organization. 
A useful starting point in seeing how this process works is the implementation of 
the organization’s incentive system, which is a key part of the organization’s hardware. 
An organization’s promotion and compensation systems can have significant influence on 
employees’ attitudes on corruption.89 Rewarding employees for only the end result (e.g., 
winning the contract) and not considering the means (e.g., whether or not they paid a 
bribe), punishes employees for losing a contract because they refused to a pay a bribe or 
use a questionable agent. As employees see that their rewards are based only the ends, 
they receive an implicit message that the organization encourages employees to use 
                                                 
87 See Brief et al., supra note 71, at 473. 
88 Id. at 473. 
89 Anand et al., supra note 66, at 14 (referring to the process of co-optation). 
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unethical means to reach those ends.90 This message gets communicated to employees 
even if the organization has clear policies on bribery, as the actual implementation of the 
incentive system communicates what the organization “really values.”91 Moreover, 
poorly drafted anti-bribery policies can also send this message that the firm’s true 
priorities are winning the contract. For example, one study found that less than one-half 
of firms involved in international business have a written policy stating that the company 
acknowledges that refusing to pay a bribe may result in lost business.92 Such an incentive 
system in practice works to further an employee’s rationalization that she has no 
responsibility for her wrongful actions, as she has no other alternative but to pay the 
bribe. In addition to the reward system, the authority structure inherent in organizations 
gives legitimacy to these implicit or explicit orders to engage in questionable acts.93  
Over time, these actions that once raised doubt in employees’ minds and forced 
them to rationalize their behavior become routine.94 Employees no longer question, for 
example, failing to conduct appropriate due diligence on agents so they can avoid direct 
                                                 
90 Brief et al., supra note 71, at 474. A recent survey by KPMG asked respondents what causes employees 
to engage in misconduct. The most common response—selected by 57% of respondents—was they 
employees “feel pressure to do ‘whatever it takes’ to meet business targets.” KPMG, supra note 25, at 6. In 
addition, 47% of respondents pinned blame on a belief that they would be rewarded only for their results 
and not the means used, and 46% identified a fear of losing their jobs if they did not meet their targets. Id. 
Others have referred to this problem more generally as resulting from a “finance mode of control.” See 
Monahan and Quinn, supra note 61, at 364-65 (reviewing the literature). Under this mode, upper 
management pushes down the hierarchy the problems of managing “conflicts between imperative for profit 
and for adherence to external regulations and norms” by setting “financial goals for subunits and set[ting] 
their workers loose to pursue those goals.” Id. 
91 John M. Darley, The Dynamics of Authority Influence in Organizations and the Unintended Action 
Consequences in SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS 37, 40 (John M. Darley et 
al., eds, 2001) [hereinafter Darley, Dynamics]. Darley summarizes this point by stating that “talk is 
meaningful to the extent that it connects with the incentives eventually provided through the incentive 
system.” Id. 
92 Berenbeim, supra note 40, at 18-19. 
93 Brief et al., supra note 71, at 477-79; Darley, Dynamics, supra note 91, at 38-39. 
94 Id. at 482-83 
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knowledge of the agents’ acts, or listing questionable payments as ordinary business 
expenses. Acts that may appear so clearly wrong to an outsider become the banal, day-to-
day functions of a member of the organization (or a sub-group within the organization).95 
As new members enter the organization, they are slowly socialized into the standard 
practices of the organization and the system perpetuates itself.96 In addition, the system 
can strengthen over time, as those that dislike the practices leave the organization while 
those that participate stay and are promoted.97 
Reinforcing this process is the strength of the expectation in the organization that 
employees must obey upper management without question. In some situations, 
management explicitly orders employees to commit questionable acts,98 but in other 
situations employees can wrongfully assume they were ordered to commit the acts. 
Employees make incorrect assumptions because they seek to standout by taking the 
initiative and therefore act upon orders before they are given. They determine these 
orders by intuiting what management would want based on the objectives they were told 
to accomplish and without asking a lot of questions.99 In either the case of explicit orders 
                                                 
95 Id. at 484. 
96 Id. at 488-90. 
97 John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing in CODES OF CONDUCT: 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 13, 37-38 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 
1996) [hereinafter Darley, Socialize]. 
98 At KPMG, senior partners allegedly attempted to pressure to engage in potentially illegal acts related to 
tax shelters without questioning the appropriateness of the acts by sending out emails stating “you will do 
this now” in red font, or responding to questions that were asked by stating, “you’re either on the team or 
off the team.” Hess, supra note 80, at 1800-1801n.126. 
99 Darley, Socialize, supra note 91, at 24-25. Darley also provides an example of organizational cover-ups 
of wrongdoing that is instructive here. Once managers discover that their acts (or failures to act) have 
unintentionally caused the organization to commit a harmful act, social dynamics in the organization and 
psychological processes push those managers to deny that harm occurred or that the harm was caused by 
their actions. Id. at 26-27. Lower-level employees that are more directly aware of the harm and its cause, 
then interpret management’s denial has a tacit order to lie about the harm and its organizational causes. Id. 
at 27. This dynamic is more likely to occur in an organizational culture with a strong obedience to authority 
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or assumed orders, the result is the same; employees are more likely to engage in 
unethical conduct, they do not deliver “bad” news to their superiors that could change 
those superiors’ orders, and they do not report wrongdoing committed by others that they 
observe.100 Overall, in a culture where employees are expected to have “unquestioned 
obedience” to their supervisors, employees rationalize their acts by believing that they are 
not the person morally responsible for their actions as they have no alternative but to 
follow their orders. 
 Other aspects of the organization’s software that matter more for improving 
ethical behavior than its hardware101 include leadership’s demonstrated commitment to 
ethics, fair treatment of employees, and employees’ confidence in being able to have an 
open discussion on the ethical issues related to any decision they must make.102 When 
these factors are not present, wrongful behavior is more likely. All of these factors are 
involved in a complex process that top management likely does not fully understand and 
                                                                                                                                                 
norm. Similarly, for corrupt payments, the same process can occur when an organization starts to see 
evidence that an agent who has been vital to the winning of new contracts in a country may be making 
improper payments. 
100 Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works And What Hurts, 41 
CALIF. MGMT. REV. 131, 136-37 & 143-44 (1999 [hereinafter Treviño et al., Managing Ethics].   
101 See Id. at 136-40 (finding that formal characteristics of a compliance program were less important than 
informal aspects of implementation and the firm’s culture for such outcomes as observed unethical/illegal 
behavior, awareness of ethical/legal issues, seeking advice on ethical issues, delivering bad news to 
management, reporting observed violations, and improved decision making). 
102  Id. at 141-44; see also Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Bladder, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate 
Employee Conduct? The Antecedents of Rule Following in Work Settings, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1143, 1153-
54 (2005) (providing empirical evidence on the importance of fair treatment of employees over command-
and-control type approaches for obtaining organizational rule-following behavior); ETHICS RESOURCE 
CENTER, NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY: HOW EMPLOYEE VIEW ETHICS IN THEIR ORGANIZATIONS 
1994–2005, at 60, 89 (2005) (providing data showing the importance of demonstrated ethical commitment 
by top management for reducing unethical behavior within organizations and improving the conditions that 
make unethical behavior less likely (e.g., willingness to report misconduct, less pressure to compromise the 
organization’s standards)). 
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probably has misperceived.103  The development of a corrupt corporate culture is an 
insidious process that evolves over time. As Kim states, employees become “complicit in 
[wrongdoing], not through any overt or explicit calculation, but through a subtle and 
implicit reconfiguration of preferences, self-conception, and motivation.”104  
Of course, the key to preventing employees from rationalizing behavior or being 
socialized into unethical practices is prevention; establishing an ethical culture before 
wrongdoing occurs and becomes institutionalized as routine.105 Part III reviews the 
current attempts by the law to encourage corporations to develop ethical cultures and 
discusses how these approaches fit into a New Governance approach to regulation. This 
sets the foundation for Part IV’s development of the necessary next steps for the effective 
use of Reform Undertakings. 
 
III. New Governance Regulation and Corporate Compliance Programs 
A. Understanding New Governance Regulation 
New Governance is an alternative approach to regulating business that is 
receiving greater attention lately by both regulators and legal scholars. This approach to 
regulation is based on the basic belief that effective implementation of any law or 
                                                 
103 See Ethics Resource Center, supra note 85, at 75 (discussing empirical evidence showing that although 
top management may believe they are projecting a commitment to ethics, lower level managers and 
employees often have different perceptions); Linda Klebe Treviño, Out of Touch: The CEO’s Role in 
Corporate Misbehavior, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1195, 1208–1209 (2005) (stating that upper level management 
often has a significantly more positive view of the organization’s ethical culture than do lower level 
employees). 
104  Sung Hui Kim, Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 983 , 997 (2005). Kim’s article is a discussion of inside counsels’ complicity in corporate fraud, but 
the social-psychology literature that she relies on directly applies to the corporate culture issues discussed 
here. 
105 Anand et al., supra note 66, at 17-18. 
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regulation requires “empathetic understanding” of the specific situation of the regulated 
entity and allowing that organization to have an active role in determining its strategies 
for compliance.106 In addition, such an approach “will be most effective if the firm . . . 
absorbs [those compliance strategies] into its meaning structure so that they become part 
of its mode of operation or existence.”107 Thus, this approach is a move away from 
command-and-control regulation where the government’s only role is to set definite rules 
and then punish noncompliance, and a move towards a more decentralized approach 
where the government sets basic goals and seeks direct involvement from corporations in 
developing individualized strategies to attain those goals. 
Regulators are using this approach is in such diverse areas as environmental 
regulation,108 food safety,109 occupational health and safety,110 and employment 
                                                 
106 Rubin, supra note 19, at 2107-2108. New Governance has emerged as a global term to refer to a broadly 
consistent, but not homogeneous, area of scholarship.  Key works in the theoretical development of this 
approach include Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998), Susan Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 Geo. L.J. 1355 
(1991), and Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 111; see also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public 
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000).  For a lively conversation on how to characterize the New 
Governance approach, see Lobel, id., at 348, 371-404 (identifying the basic organizing principles of the 
New Governance approach as “increased participation of nonstate actors, stakeholder collaboration, 
diversity and competition, decentralization and subsidiarity, integration of policy domains, flexibility and 
noncoerciveness, adaptability and dynamic learning, and legal orchestration among proliferated norm-
generating entities”); see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and In the 
World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 471 (2004) (providing a 
critique of Lobel’s characterization of New Governance, and, inter alia, distinguishing between approaches 
based on Gunther Teubner’s reflexive law and approaches grounded in John Dewey’s philosophical 
pragmatism ).  For additional review, see Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisonsin’s 
New Governance Experiment, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 645, 676-83 (2006) (identifying the core elements of a 
democratic experimentalist approach to New Governance as “experimentation, provisional rules, 
benchmarking of best practices, and structures of accountability based on transparency.”) 
107 Rubin, supra note 19, at 2108 
108 Robert F. Durant et al., Introduction in ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED: CHALLENGES, 
CHOICES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 1, 1 (Robert F. Durant et al. eds., 2004). 
109 Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to 
Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 691, 696–98 (2003). 
110 Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1071 (2005). 
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discrimination.111 In each case, the organization plays a significant role in developing its 
own strategies for compliance with the law. This reflects basic New Governance 
principles of experimentation at the local level112 but with the lessons from those 
experiments spread throughout the system through a process of dynamic learning that 
creates continual improvement.113 The role of the law is to orchestrate this process by 
“facilitating innovation, standardizing good practices, and researching and replicating 
success stories from local or private levels.”114  
A primary example of this approach for organizations involves efforts to prevent 
employment discrimination. The challenge for the law in this area is to end what Sturm 
refers to as “second generation” discrimination.115 Second generation discrimination has 
its causes rooted in the structural features of the organization and its culture, 116 as 
opposed to “first generation” discrimination which is based on overt and intentional 
actions.117 Likewise, as discussed earlier, problems of corrupt practices within 
organizations are more complex than individuals making a rational decision to pay a 
bribe in full awareness of its wrongfulness and its potential consequences for themselves 
and their organizations. The observations that Strum makes about the problems and limits 
of a traditional rule-enforcement model of reducing discrimination equally apply to 
                                                 
111 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 458, 475–76 (2001) [hereinafter Sturm, Second Generation]. 
112 Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 379-82 (2004) (discussing the importance of learning through a 
diversity of approaches and encouraging continual improvement). 
113 Id. at 395-400.  
114 Id. at 395-401.  
115 Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 111, at 468. 
116 Id. at 468-69. 
117 Id. at 465-67. 
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combating corruption. In general, Sturm argues that a rule-enforcement model 
encourages lawyers and compliance officials to adopt strategies focused on reducing “the 
short-term risk of legal exposure rather than strategies that address the underlying 
problem.”118 In the area of corruption, this is evidenced by the fact that the growth in 
anti-corruption laws globally is causing more managers to state that legal risks are a more 
important factor in the development and monitoring of their anti-bribery compliance 
programs than are concerns related to ethics and the ethical culture of the organization.119 
Instead of a rule-enforcement model, a New Governance model utilizes the law as 
a tool to encourage corporations to use a problem-solving approach towards combating 
corruption. Through “legal orchestration,” firms should be encouraged to engage with 
their employees and outside consultants to identify the problems rooted in the 
organization’s hardware and software, and then develop (and then continually improve) 
workable solutions.120 
 
B. The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG) can be viewed as a form of 
New Governance regulation.121 Under the OSG, if a firm adopts an effective compliance 
program (that is, one that meets seven basic hardware requirements set out in the 
guidelines), then it will receive a reduced sentence if it is later found guilty of a crime. 
The idea behind the guidelines is for the government to establish the goals and basic 
                                                 
118 Id. at 476. 
119 Berenbeim, supra note 40, at 17. 
120 Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 111, at 522-23. 
121 See Rubin, supra note 19, at 2108. 
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parameters of a compliance program, and then let the firm utilize its knowledge to best 
implement such a program so that it is effective, as well as consistent with the firm’s 
structure and strategy. In recognition of the importance of the firm’s software for 
ensuring an effective program, the 2004 amendments to the OSG refer to “compliance 
and ethics programs”122 and require that firms “promote an organizational culture that 
encourages ‘ethical’ conduct.”123 Thus, although the government cannot compel any 
organization to be “ethical,” it can attempt to establish appropriate incentives for 
organizations to determine what it means to be ethical—under the OSG, being ethical 
simply means compliance with the law—and how to develop such an ethical culture for 
their organization. 
Although many firms may attempt to meaningfully implement a compliance 
program—and, if done appropriately, there is empirical evidence to suggest they can be 
effective124—many other firms may seek the benefits of a mitigated sentence by adopting 
only the appearance of a compliance program. More importantly, under the McNulty 
Memo, the benefits are not just a reduced sentenced but allowing the corporation to avoid 
prosecution all together. Because prosecutors cannot easily determine which corporations 
have meaningfully implemented a compliance program and which have not, creating only 
the appearance of adopting without the cost and effort of actual adoption is an attractive 
                                                 
122  Paul Fiorelli and Ann Marie Tracey, Why Comply? Organizational Guidelines Offer a Safer Harbor in 
the Storm, 32 J. CORP. L. 467, 483 (noting that the revised guidelines make forty-five references to 
“compliance and ethics programs”). 
123 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §8B2.1(a)(2) (2006). 
124 See Hess, supra note 80, at 1791-95 (providing a review of the empirical studies on the effectiveness of 
compliance programs). 
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strategy. This is commonly referred to as the problem of “cosmetic compliance.”125 At 
the extreme, cosmetic compliance creates a moral hazard problem where corporations 
with largely symbolic compliance programs actually take less care to prevent wrongdoing 
because they have protection against prosecution and end up committing more wrongful 
acts.126  
A related problem may be referred to as “calculated cooperation.” By cooperating 
with prosecutors, corporations are less likely to be prosecuted and instead the government 
will only file charges against individuals. This policy is contained in the McNulty memo 
and the Thompson memo before that.127 Credit for cooperation128 is not without 
controversy, however. Recently, the controversy has been over prosecutors requiring 
corporations to waive attorney-client privilege to be considered as “cooperating.”129 For 
this article’s purposes, the main concern is that credit for cooperation leads to the 
corporation scapegoating certain employees to end the governmental inquiry without 
adequate examination of the organizational causes of the wrongful act, such as the 
corporate culture.130 
                                                 
125 William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 1343, 1407 (1999); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated 
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491-92 (2003). 
126 Laufer, supra note 125, at 1415-18  
127 Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle And Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial 
Pressure On Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 82-86 (2007). 
128 Ford, supra note 23, at 792-96. 
129 Id. 
130 Laufer refers to this problem as reverse whistle blowing. William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, 
Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 648-49, 657-63 (2002). Under reverse 
whistle blowing, it is possible for upper management to implicate lower-level management in the 
wrongdoing and thus end the government’s investigation even though the corporation had a culture of 
encouraging the wrongful behavior. Id. at 657-63. 
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Due to problems of cosmetic compliance and calculated cooperation, the OSG 
does not adequately address the issue of requiring problematic firms to actually change 
their culture. Instead, bribe-paying firms can easily decouple these efforts from the actual 
culture of the organization. In addition, granting leniency to corporations for calculated 
cooperation does not provide an incentive for firms to meaningfully conduct a full 
analysis of their culture to determine why corrupt payments persist and then take the 
necessary steps to right that culture. Thus, for corporations that have demonstrated that 
corruption is rooted deep in their culture, some other approach is needed.  
 
C. Beyond Carrots and Sticks: The Challenge of Reversing Corrupt Corporate 
Cultures 
As stated earlier, corruption is not necessarily a problem of “rational profit 
maximizers” making calculated cost-benefit decisions on whether or not the firm should 
make improper payments. In many cases, the use of improper payments becomes an 
unquestioned organizational norm that no longer raises a moral question with employees. 
The initial cause of these norms can be either the intentional or intentional acts of upper 
management. Either way, once these practices become embedded in the firm’s culture, 
they are not easily reversed. Thus, simply requiring bribe-paying firms to improve their 
compliance programs and internal controls will likely not be sufficient. The firm must 
find ways to reverse its corrupt culture and then maintain that improved culture going 
forward. 
Drawing on social psychology research, Brief and colleagues suggest several 
ways that may work in reversing a culture of wrongdoing and allowing employees to 
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stand up for what is right rather than blindly following implicit and explicit orders.131 In 
short, the organization must find ways to support “functional disobedience,” which is the 
open challenge to the legitimacy of implicit or explicit orders to engage in unethical 
behaviors.132 A primary way to do this is through social norms of open 
communication.133 Such norms allow employees to state their ethical concerns with 
organizational practices and find others with similar misgivings.134 With the support of 
others, that employee is more likely to respond with responsible behavior rather than 
simply follow orders or comply with existing routines.135 To promote functional 
disobedience, Brief and colleagues state that “the goal of disobeying morally 
questionable orders must be emphasized by management, methods and procedures for 
accomplishing this goal must be visibly in place, employees must be rewarded for 
functional disobedience, support (e.g., training) for accomplishing this goal must be 
readily available, and employees generally must feel their personal welfare is protected 
by management.”136  Brief and colleagues emphasize that all of these factors must be 
present, and the absence of any one can result in a continued culture of wrongdoing.137  
Not surprisingly, these factors that can reverse an unethical culture are the same 
factors identified by researchers as necessary to maintain an ethical corporate culture.138 
The way to put these factors into operation is not simply through the adoption of a 
                                                 
131 See Brief et al., supra note 71, at 491-92. 
132 Id. at 492. 
133 Id. at 493. 
134 Id. at 493. 
135 Id. at 493. 
136 Id. at 494. 
137 Id. at 495. 
138 See Treviño et al., Managing Ethics, supra note 100, at 141-44. 
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compliance program consistent with the OSG requirements, but through the adoption of 
an integrity-based program. Integrity-based programs refer to compliance and ethics 
programs not based primarily on following the rules and punishment for violations, but 
primarily on the emphasis of shared organizational values.139 Existing empirical evidence 
suggests that compliance programs with a stronger integrity-based foundation are more 
effective in attaining a positive ethical climate and reducing unethical behavior than 
programs based simply on rule enforcement.140 External pressures to adopt a compliance 
program, however, can work against the adoption of an integrity-based program because 
to outsiders such programs may look less rigorous and merely symbolic.141 In addition, 
for an organization already heavily engaged in wrongful conduct, an external change 
agent may be necessary to reverse embedded wrongdoing and install an integrity-based 
program, as insiders “may lack the ability, will, and credibility to effect the needed 
changes.”142 
Overall, two things are necessary to reverse the cultures of corrupt corporations. 
First, firms must adopt a problem-solving approach to determine what factors of the 
organization’s culture are contributing to the continuation of corrupt payments. As 
indicated earlier, this is not an easy task, as corporate cultures related to ethical behavior 
involve complex interactions of multiple factors. Second, firms must reverse that culture 
and ensure that an ethical culture exists going forward. This requires finding the right 
                                                 
139 Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 106, 
110–11; Gary R. Weaver & Linda Klebe Treviño, Compliance and Values Oriented Ethics Programs: 
Influences on Employees’ Attitudes and Behavior, 9 BUS. ETHICS Q. 315, 315-16 (1999) 
140  For a review of the empirical literature, see Hess, supra note 80, at 1791-93 & 1802-3. 
141   Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance With Law, 
2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 105, 113 (2002). 
142 Anand et al., supra note 66, at 20-21. 
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balance of a rules-based approach to compliance programs and an integrity-based 
approach. Due to each corporation’s unique history and situation, this balance will vary 
between firms. Reform Undertakings are the best mechanism available to prosecutors and 
enforcers to achieve these goals. Part IV further describes Reform Undertakings and their 
necessary requirements for success. 
 
IV. Combating Corporate Corruption through Reform Undertakings 
A. Reform Undertakings and New Governance Regulation 
1. Reform Undertakings: What, Why, When 
Reform Undertakings are agreements between the DOJ or SEC and 
corporations143 (or other regulated entities144) that settle investigations related to 
                                                 
143 The examples are many and they increase every month. Examples include Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Company for channel stuffing (described by prosecutors of the case at Christie & Hanna, supra note); 
Computer Associates for securities fraud (US v Computer Associates International, Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement, filed in US District Court, Eastern District of New York, Sept. 22, 2004) (copy on file with 
authors); Aspen Technologies for securities fraud (In the Matter of Aspen Technology, Order Instituting 
Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to 
Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, July 31, 2007, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/33-8827.pdf); Delta & Pine Land Company for violations of the 
FCPA (In the Matter of Delta & Pine Land Company, Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, 
Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, July 27, 2007, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-56138.pdf); 
Statoil for violations of the FCPA (In the Matter of Statoil ASA, Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist 
Proceedings, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to Section 21C of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, October 13, 2006, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54599.pdf). 
144 Letter from David N. Kelley, U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y., to Robert S. Bennett, Attorney for KPMG LLP, 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Aug. 26, 2005), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/August05/kpmgdpagmt.pdf;  In the Matter of General 
American Life Insurance Company, Securities Act Release No. 8832, August 9, 2007, available at  
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/33-8832.pdf; In re National Stock Exchange, Exchange Act 
Release No. 51714, May 19, 2005, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-51714.pdf.   
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violations of the securities law, including FCPA violations.145 As a term of the settlement 
or agreement, the corporation agrees to improve its compliance programs and to retain, at 
its own expense, an independent third party monitor, consultant, or auditor (the “Third 
Party”) to provide expert assistance with, and possibly to oversee, the corporation’s 
implementation of that program.146  The Third Party’s role is to intervene in the firm over 
a period ranging anywhere from six months to three years and to identify compliance 
failures and reasons for the alleged law violation.147  The Third Party then reports back to 
the regulator or prosecutor as to his findings, his recommendations for improvements to 
the compliance program, and the steps taken by the corporation in response to those 
recommendations.148   
Reform Undertakings reflect a profound shift in prosecutorial and enforcement 
philosophy. In comparison to conventional sanctions such as monetary penalties or 
criminal prosecution of individuals, the Reform Undertaking is more open-ended, less 
deterministic, and significantly more interventionist. As such, they are most appropriate 
for the “worst actor” cases. 149 That is, those cases where the corrupt practices are the 
                                                 
145 Ford, supra note 23, at 759-60. They may also be court-ordered, or administratively ordered.  Id. at 797-
98. Previously, the Reform Undertaking term was used to refer only to settlements with regulatory 
enforcement staffers, but for present purposes similarly-structured agreements reached with criminal 
prosecutors pursuant to deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements also qualify. See generally, 
Id . Garrett focuses only on DOJ deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, and uses the term 
“structural reform prosecution.” Garrett, supra note 18, at 854-55. 
146 Khanna and Dickenson, supra note 17, at 1721-26. 
147 Id. at 1721-26. 
148 US v. Baker Hughes Incorporated, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 60, at 15-17 (requiring 
the corporate monitor to provide three separate reports during the term of DPA, with each providing the 
monitor’s assessment of the company’s progress in establishing a compliance program and adequate 
internal controls, and making recommendations for improvements in the company’s policies and 
procedures).  
149 Ford, supra note 23, at 772-73 & 805. 
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result of the insidious organizational culture issues discussed earlier150 and where such 
practices have continued to, or are believed will, persist notwithstanding other 
sanctioning efforts. The clearest cases for the use of Reform Undertakings involve those 
corporations at the top of what Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite call the “enforcement 
pyramid.”151  When dealing with these actors, regulators should not assume that 
voluntary (post-enforcement) steps toward assuring the use of an effective compliance 
program are necessarily bona fide, rather than taken in an attempt to mitigate sanctions 
through external appearances only.152  Nor should regulators automatically assume that 
corporate protestations are credible that claim their problems are the result of an insular 
group of “bad apples.”153  In both situations—cosmetic compliance and calculated 
cooperation—the enforcement environment has created a skewing effect and encouraged 
strategic action by corporations in trouble with criminal or regulatory authorities.  The 
cases for which Reform Undertakings are most appropriate are precisely those in which 
voluntary self-regulation has demonstrably failed. 
Based on the available public records, Schnitzer Steel appears to be one such 
“worst actor” case. According to the SEC’s cease-and-desist order, two wholly-owned 
subsidiaries of Schnitzer Steal made improper payments in China and South Korea on 
their own behalf and as an agent for other customers from 1999 to 2004.154 Although 
many of the payments were mostly in small increments ranging from $3,000 to $15,000, 
                                                 
150 See supra Part II.D. 
151 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 38-41 (1991). 
152 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (discussing cosmetic compliance). 
153 See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (discussing calculated cooperation). 
154 In the Matter of Schnitzer Steel Industries Inc., Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Making 
Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, Oct. 16, 2006, at 2-3, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54606.pdf. 
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over the course of those five years those payments totaled over $1.8 million.155 In an 
attempt to hide the improper payments, the subsidiaries used schemes to disguise the 
payments as “refunds” or recorded payments to government officials as “sales 
commissions,” for example.156 In some cases, the heads of the subsidiaries used secret 
bank accounts to make the payments.157 
The involvement of two subsidiaries, the frequency of the payments, and the 
attempts to disguise them over an extended period of time, strongly suggest that these 
practices had become embedded as a routine practice within the corporate culture. 
Moreover, during this time, Schnitzer Steel did not implement a system of controls to 
monitor compliance with the FCPA, nor did it provide its employees or agents with even 
basic training on the requirements of the FCPA.158 Even when company compliance 
officials notified executives of suspected improper payments in 2004, the company 
continued to pay bribes that were already promised and instructed employees to increase 
“entertainment expenses” to clients to make up for any reduction in direct cash 
payments.159 Thus, although the company engaged in “exceptional cooperation” with the 
government,160 Schnitzer Steal has demonstrated that it belongs in the “worst actor” 
category and needs significant assistance in reversing its corrupt corporate culture.   
                                                 
155 Id. at 2-3. 
156 Id. at 3. 
157 Id. 
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159 Id. at 4. 
160 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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Likewise, Baker Hughes, discussed earler,161 also appears to be a “worst actor” 
that suffers from an organizational culture where improper payments have become the 
norm and are not questioned. Despite the issuance of an SEC cease-and-desist order 
related to improper payments in 2001 that required the company to implement 
appropriate controls, the company continued to engage in the payment of bribes, 
falsifying those payments in company records,162 and, according to the SEC complaint, 
exercised willful blindness163 towards the use of possibly corrupt agents.164 Overall, the 
use of corrupt payments continued from at least 1998 to 2005, and occurred with agents 
or employees in six different countries.165 In addition, with respect to improper payments 
that Baker Hughes admitted to in its DPA, those payments (totaling over $4.1 million) 
were authorized by multiple heads of Baker Hughes operating divisions.166 Although the 
legal department was allegedly made aware that the company planned to hire a new agent 
(whose commission was the improper payment), proper due diligence was not carried out 
by the managers involved and the legal department did nothing more than hand the 
necessary forms to the managers.167 
                                                 
161 See supra notes 6-7 and 57-60 and accompanying text. 
162 Baker Hughes Incorporated, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 60, at Attachment A, pp. 11-
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For these “worst actor” corporations, the Reform Undertaking has several 
advantages relative to conventional regulatory mechanisms, such as stand-alone monetary 
sanctions or sanctions targeting only individuals within the organization. Most 
importantly, the Reform Undertaking responds to concerns about cosmetic compliance, 
scapegoating, institutional capacity, and limitations of deterrence in effecting 
thoroughgoing reform of corporate cultures. Specifically, this mechanism recognizes and 
accepts both the strengths and weaknesses of the prosecutorial/enforcement model. That 
is, it accepts that prosecutors do not have the resources or inclination to engage in 
ongoing, deep reform efforts at individual corporations, although they have significant 
flexibility in crafting case-specific remedies.168  In addition, to a certain degree, Reform 
Undertakings uncouple the liability phase of prosecution or enforcement from the 
remedial phase.  By setting parameters for a post-settlement process mediated by a Third 
Party rather than directly by a prosecutor, Reform Undertakings create a temporal, 
structural, and dialogical space for trying to work through stubborn cultural problems.   
This reduces (though obviously cannot eliminate) the pressure toward strategic action by 
the corporation.  At the same time, Reform Undertakings can be even more 
                                                 
168 Perhaps counterintuitively, prosecutors and regulatory enforcement staffers may in some ways be more 
receptive to New Governance style methods than mainstream regulators. See MALCOLM SPARROW, THE 
REGULATORY CRAFT: CONTROLLING RISKS, SOLVING PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE 49-64 
(2000). Some of the key priorities underlying New Governance regulation – pragmatism, flexibility, 
incrementalism, learning by doing – should be familiar to them.  Prosecutors and regulators work in 
flexible, temporary, case-specific teams.  They work from the specific to the general, not the other way 
around.  The nature of the concrete problem facing them requires that they take an outcome-oriented and 
pragmatic, rather than philosophical or ideological, approach.  Prosecutors and enforcers have also become 
accustomed to decentralization and delegating some aspects of their operations (such as information 
gathering and, more recently, implementation of compliance processes) to the corporations being 
investigated.   
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“destabilizing”169 to a corrupt corporation than regular prosecutions or enforcement 
actions, and do so in a more constructive manner; they put in motion a process with 
unpredictable effects, and this amplifies the impact of the process on the corporation. 
Moreover, Reform Undertakings, through their explicit problem-solving methods, 
have the capacity to distinguish between cosmetic compliance and genuine compliance.  
Unlike one-shot deterrent sanctions where the broader effect is hard to ascertain, Reform 
Undertakings present an opportunity for prosecutors and enforcers to discern the 
underlying causes of corporate wrongdoing and then work towards determining how to 
reform corporate culture.  This gives prosecutors and enforcers a stronger evidentiary 
basis for the application of Ayres’ and Braithwaite’s famous enforcement pyramid.170  
Consequently, the entire process becomes more transparent and credible, which 
potentially can have positive effects throughout the industry or relevant community by 
granting a sense of legitimacy and fairness to the entire enforcement process.171   
2. Reform Undertakings: How 
There are certain fundamental attributes that are necessary to ensure that Reform 
Undertakings serve as a powerful tool for effecting meaningful change in corporate 
cultures.   First, the Reform Undertaking must be transparent in its processes and explicit 
in its reason-giving.  Transparency fosters credibility and trust, which are fundamental to 
                                                 
169 See Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation 
Succeeds,  117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004) (adopting the concept of destabilization from Roberto M. Unger 
to the public law litigation context) 
170 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
171 See generally, Tyler, supra note 78 (observing that people are more likely to abide by laws they consider 
rational and fairly applied) 
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the sort of iterative and investigative exercise contemplated here.172  Second, the Third 
Party must employ a forward-looking, problem-solving methodology rather than a 
retrospective, blame-allocating one.173  This entails constructively identifying and 
responding to problems, and precludes whitewashing efforts by the corporation. Although 
the process should be remedial instead of punitive, a credible enforcement capacity 
should be held in reserve should the Reform Undertaking fall apart, as is currently the 
case with current deferred prosecution agreements.174  Indeed, whether considering the 
regulatory environment (where purely punitive measures are impermissible) or the 
prosecutorial one (where they are almost assumed), forward-looking remedial 
mechanisms are better suited to dealing with corporate actors.175   
                                                 
172 See Ford, supra note 23.  The kind of transparency that matters here is transparency toward the 
participants in the Reform Undertaking process.  Whether documents like the Third Party’s reports should 
be made available to others, including members of the public, is a more difficult question.  This kind of 
openness fosters accountability, but also imposes a potentially crippling chill on parties’ willingness to 
communicate freely.  Existing Reform Undertakings make no provision for public dissemination of third 
party reports. One of the author of this article’s requests for such documents under the Freedom of 
Information Act have thus far been declined, generally on the basis that the disclosure of documents could 
reasonably be expected to interfere with law enforcement activities.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A), 17 CFR 
§ 200.80(b)(7)(i). 
173 In other words, the Third Party must, in part, serve as a valued member of the team seeking to solve the 
problem at-hand and achieve a common goal, as opposed to an external agent seeking to discover who is at-
fault. See Kathleen M. Eisenhardt et al., How Management Teams Can Have a Good Fight, HARV. BUS. 
REV., July/Aug. 1997, at 77, 80-81 (stressing the importance of finding a common goal for the team to 
work towards to avoid discussions deteriorating into unproductive arguments over blame); see also David 
A. Garvin & Michael A. Roberto, What You Don't Know About Making Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 
2001, at 108 (contrasting an advocacy approach to argument, which focuses on persuading and blaming, 
versus an inquiry approach, which focuses on problem-solving and constructive criticism). 
174 See Baker Hughes Incorporated, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 60, at 20-22 (stating that 
if Baker Hughes violates any terms of the agreement (determined by the “sole discretion” of the DOJ) then 
it may be subject to prosecution and that prosecution “may be premised on information provided by Baker 
Hughes”). 
175 For example, many argue that attributing criminal liability to corporations is incoherent. See, e.g., V. S. 
Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996). A 
classic statement of this position is “Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no 
soul to be damned and no body to be kicked?” John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: 
An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981) 
(quoting Edward, the first Baron Thurlow, from the 18th Century). Moreover, criminal enterprises aside, 
corporations provide important public benefits (including shareholder and economic value, employment, 
and goods and services), meaning that there is good reason to attempt to reform rather than vindictively 
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Third, the Reform Undertaking process should be flexible.  To be successful, 
Reform Undertakings must be capable of engaging in the experimentation necessary to 
determine what works, learn from past experience, and be updated based on new 
information. These capabilities are necessary to ensure the development of remedial 
measures tailored to each corporation’s unique history and current situation. 
Organizational cultures are complex and the relevant factors—such as, leadership, reward 
systems, communication norms, and employee perceptions of justice—combine in 
different ways in different corporations, although the end result may be same: a culture 
that accepts the payment of bribes by employees and agents.176 Thus, flexibility is 
necessary to ensure that the Reform Undertaking is appropriately sensitive to challenge 
at-hand and has the capacity to evolve as the actors gain new knowledge into the root 
causes of the corporation’s problems. 
The fourth attribute is closely related to the third, and goes to the ultimate goal of 
this regulatory approach: the Reform Undertaking should seek to “grow” endogenous 
connections between its own processes and the corporation’s unique profile. Because the 
problem of corruption within these “worst actor” firms is embedded in their culture, 
Reform Undertakings must seek to leverage the corporation’s resources, capabilities, 
strategic orientation, and values, in the service of effecting thoroughgoing reform.  
Among other things, this means avoiding unreflective mimicry of what may have worked 
                                                                                                                                                 
hobble them. This concern is reflected in the McNulty Memo’s direction to prosecutors that they consider 
the “collateral consequences” to society when deciding whether or not to prosecute a corporation. McNulty, 
supra note 64, at 4. 
176 See supra Part II.D.2 
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for other corporations that engaged in similar conduct.177 Consistent with integrity-based 
compliance programs,178 the Reform Undertaking must encourage the corporation to 
internally develop its values and then support those values with the appropriate structures 
and systems.179 
In principle, none of the above attributes seem beyond the capacity of any existing 
Reform Undertaking, although empirical verification still remains to be done.  Three 
additional factors seem equally essential. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests greater 
difficulty in incorporating these attributes into Reform Undertakings. First, there should 
be broad and well-managed participation by all levels of the organization in the process. 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of such participation when the goal is to effect 
change to existing culture through the questioning of current practices180 and the internal 
development of organizational values that support ethics over the continuation of 
corruption.181 This importance becomes clear when considering such cases as Schnitzer 
Steel182 and Baker Hughes,183 where employees at various levels of the corporate 
hierarchy and in various geographic locations apparently participated in longstanding and 
widespread wrongdoing. Without the participation of employees representing these 
different positions, then the organization is more likely to misperceive the true causes of 
                                                 
177 See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., 1991). 
178 See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text. 
179 Paine, supra note 139, at 112. 
180 See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text (discussing Brief and colleagues arguments in support of 
“functional disobedience” to reverse corrupt corporate cultures). 
181 See supra notes 139-40  and accompanying text (discussing the importance of integrity-based 
compliance programs). 
182 See supra notes 154-60 and accompanying text. 
183 See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text. 
 46 
the breakdown in the organization’s software. In brief, changing corporate culture 
requires a combination of top-down, demonstrated leadership commitment to ethics, and 
bottom-up, direct employee participation in self-governance. Top management, with its 
skewed view of the ethical climate of the firm and how employees perceive their ethical 
leadership, 184 cannot meaningful change corporate culture without this participation.  
Although there is evidence that the drafters of some settlement agreements 
recognize the importance of broad participation,185 in other cases, this factor may pose 
significant challenges to allowing Reform Undertakings to achieve their full potential. 
This includes incorporating meaningful participation from not just lower-level 
employees, but also top management. For a number of Third Party monitorships in 
securities law enforcement, these problems result from an expert-centric approach to the 
role of the monitor.186 Although these types of monitors can bring valuable expertise to 
the process, an approach centered on top-down recommendations for structural change 
from the Third Party cannot be a substitute for a corporation’s own problem-solving 
process. The endogenous changes necessary to create a sustainable ethical culture must 
include the corporation’s direct and meaningful involvement.  
                                                 
184 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (citing empirical evidence from the Ethics Resource Center 
and Treviño). 
185 For example, the Schnitzer Steel Settlement Order stipulates that “Schnitzer shall require the 
Compliance Consultant to formulate conclusions based on sufficient evidence obtained through, among 
other things … meetings with and interviews of Schnitzer employees, officers, directors and any other 
relevant persons.” Schnitzer Steel, Cease-and-Desist, supra note 154. 
186 For examples of such approaches, consider the Breeden reports in the WorldCom and Hollinger cases. 
See Richard C. Breeden, Restoring Trust: Report to the Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, On Corporate Governance for the Future of MCI 20, 25 (Aug. 2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/worldcom/wcomreport0803.pdf; Report of Investigation by the 
Special Committee of the Board of Directors of Hollinger International Inc., August 30, 2004, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/868512/000095012304010413/y01437exv99w2.htm; see also 
Ford, supra note 23, at 807-09. 
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Even if the Third Party takes on the more appropriate role of a consultant or team 
member, the selection of the monitor will play a significant role in the ultimate success of 
the Reform Undertaking. For the DOJ’s recent DPAs, monitors are generally legally-
trained and behave much like lawyers—collecting documents and assembling a “case” of 
sorts.187  This raises the question of whether the role enacted by these Third Parties will 
lead to a sufficiently open-ended and participatory dialogic process.188  Meeting the 
necessary participation requirements is challenging and costly to create and maintain 
relative to more centralized exercises in information analysis.  Such a process cannot be 
expected to spring forth organically from the Reform Undertaking without direct 
attention to the matter on the part of those drafting the Reform Undertaking terms and 
those implementing them.  
The selection of the Third Party, then, is crucial – not only because the Third 
Party’s background and expertise affects her approach to the project, but also because the 
Third Party’s role requires a formidable range of skills and qualifications to function 
effectively. As an external change agent, the monitor should not simply audit corporate 
efforts to implement or improve compliance programs and internal controls, but must 
also work to ensure their effectiveness through changes in the organization’s software. To 
do this, monitors need to understand the various organizational hurdles related to the flow 
of information in the firm (especially bad news), how the incentive system works in 
                                                 
187 See Khanna and Dickenson, supra note 17, at 1725 (2007) (describing how monitors carry out their 
role). 
188 Khanna and Dickenson also note that Third Parties and their subject corporations frequently disagree 
about the scope and purview of the monitor’s task – or what corporations call “scope creep.”  Khanna and 
Dickenson, supra note 17, at 1725.  This suggests, predictably, that subject corporations are preoccupied 
with circumscribing the process and minimizing the destabilization it represents, while Third Parties are, 
perhaps for any number of reasons ranging from ensuring efficacy of the process to paternalistic power-
seeking, interested in expanding its ambit. 
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practice, the social norms of the organization, and other factors related to the firm’s 
culture and ethical climate. In addition, to be successful and sustainable, the changes a 
Third Party proposes must be consistent with the strategic needs of the corporation.  
To accomplish these goals, corporate monitors should have several necessary 
characteristics. First, the Third Party must have an appropriate skill set, including being 
able to facilitate dialogue and manage a collective deliberative process, with an 
appreciation for relevant power imbalances within the corporation.   Second, the Third 
Party must have credibility, both with the corporation and with prosecutors and 
regulators.  This likely requires experience in the industry (or in analogous business 
settings) and a reputation for fair dealing.189  Furthermore, the Third Party must be both 
structurally and psychologically independent from the corporation.190  The monitor 
should have no prospect of future business with the firm,191 and should have her own 
reputational capital at stake.192  Independence also requires that the Third Party be able to 
access outside support, from prosecutors or regulators, in the event of material non-
compliance by the corporation.  Third, the Third Party must be accountable for her 
actions – this means being answerable to the SEC, the Department of Justice, or the court, 
regarding not only for her recommendations for the corporation, but also for her own 
conduct.193  Collectively, these characteristics allow the Third Party to develop the trust 
                                                 
189 Ford, supra note 23, at 811. 
190 Id. 
191 Most settlement orders underlying modern Reform Undertakings set out a period of time, after the 
Reform Undertaking is concluded, during which the third party monitor may not accept any other business 
from the corporation. Id. at 811n.179. 
192 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 BUS. LAW. 1403 
(2002) (using the term “reputational capital”). 
193 Ford, supra note 23, at 813-14. 
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necessary to make the Reform Undertaking a meaningful process. Whether or not actual 
Third Parties conform to this profile remains to be seen, but Reform Undertakings—as 
products of the legal system—must not simply default to the selection of Third Parties 
that are more likely to possess legal skills than the broader problem-solving and 
facilitative skills that are necessary. 
The selection of appropriate Third Parties may not be as daunting as it initially 
appears. Since the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act there has been significant growth in 
the attempts to understand the appropriate role and qualifications of ethics and 
compliance officers, 194 and even to professionalize the role.195 These developments 
should continue to be valuable for understanding the appropriate skills of the Third 
Parties, identifying potential candidates to serve as Third Parties, and providing resources 
and experiences for understanding how to perform the role. 
 In addition, the recent empirical work by Susan Sturm on ending discrimination 
within organizations provides significant insights.196 As stated earlier, Sturm is concerned 
with “second generation” discrimination, which is discrimination that is embedded in the 
organization’s structures and culture.197 Thus, Sturm’s analysis is directly instructive to 
understanding how Third Parties can and should function in the Reform Undertaking 
                                                 
194 For organizations devoted to compliance and ethics professionals, see Society of Corporate Compliance 
and Ethics Website, at www.corporatecompliance.org; and the Open Compliance and Ethics Group 
website, at http://www.oceg.org. For a recent discussion of the appropriate role of an ethics officer, see 
CHIEF ETHICS & COMPLIANCE OFFICER (CECO) DEFINITION WORKING GROUP, LEADING CORPORATE 
INTEGRITY: DEFINING THE ROLE OF THE CHIEF ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE OFFICER (2007), available  at 
http://www.darden.edu/corporate-ethics/pdf/Leading_Corporate_Integrity_Report.pdf. 
195 Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics, CCEP Candidate Handbook (2006), available at 
http://www.corporatecompliance.org/CCEP/CCEP_2006_handbook.pdf 
196 Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247 (2006) [hereinafter Sturm, Architecture]. 
197 See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. 
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context. In her study of anti-discrimination efforts at higher educational institutions, 
Sturm focuses, in part, on the role of key third parties she calls “organizational 
catalysts.”198  Sturm describes organizational catalysts as “individuals who operate at the 
convergence of different domains and levels of activity,” and who consequently 
“leverage knowledge, ongoing strategic relationships, and accountability across 
systems.”199  As with the potential for Third Parties retained in Reform Undertakings, 
Sturm’s organizational catalysts are effective in part because they have knowledge, 
influence, and credibility across domains. Their skill sets allow them to serve as 
“information entrepreneurs,” by drawing together information from various sources to 
assist the corporation in improving its culture.200 They act as gadflies and keep the 
pressure on the organization to focus on the task at hand, as well as grant legitimacy and 
voice to those within the organization that seek positive change.201 In addition, these 
organizational catalysts cultivate new collaborative relationships amongst employees at 
all levels of the firm, as well as potentially with important outside entities.202 This 
connects employees with mutual interests and complementary roles in reducing 
corruption that would not have otherwise met, and cultivates the necessary open 
communication norms that allow employees to find support for their ethical beliefs.203 
This is consistent with the observations of several scholars, in different contexts, that the 
ability to foster dialogue and identify shared interests across seemingly impermeable 
                                                 
198 Sturm, Architecture, supra note 197, at 250-51. 
199 Id. at 287. 
200 Id. at 290-95. 
201 Id. at 297-99. 
202 Id. at 295-97. 
203 See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text (discussing mechanisms necessary to support 
“functional disobedience”). 
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group boundaries is an especially important trait of the dialogic, pragmatic nature of New 
Governance problem-solving.204 
The third outstanding attribute of a truly effective Reform Undertaking—in 
addition to broad participation and a qualified Third Party—exists at the macrolevel. This 
is the need for some form of centralized data collection, aggregation, and analysis.  
Information capture is a major advantage of Reform Undertakings relative to other 
prosecutorial and enforcement tools. Each undertaking captures a specific case study of 
what went wrong in a particular corporation, and what steps seem to work (and what do 
not) in breaking through and reversing the stubborn problems of organizational culture.  
This is invaluable information for all stakeholders in Reform Undertakings, including 
regulators, prosecutors, compliance professionals, corporations, scholars, interested 
members of the general public, and for the credibility of the Reform Undertaking project 
as a whole.  Centralized data collection and analysis provides an opportunity to determine 
the generalizability of lessons from each corporation’s experience. 
 Third Party monitors, then, should have the responsibility to collect the 
information generated from each Reform Undertaking in a form that makes it possible to 
compare experiences across firms.205  Centralized coordination of discrete problem-
solving exercises is a core component of the New Governance approach.206  The SEC is 
                                                 
204 See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation 
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1097-1100 (2004); Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman, 
Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 261, 323-27 (2004). 
205 Currently, Third Party monitors reports under deferred prosecution agreements are not required to be 
made public. Garrett, supra note 18, at 897; see also supra note 172 (noting the lack of public access to 
Third Party’s reports). 
206 On the consensus among New Governance scholars regarding the need for a clearinghouse: see Ford, 
supra note 23, at 814-15n.187. 
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positioned to have in place systems that can accommodate this informational task,207 and 
the DOJ should be encouraged to do likewise. Other interested parties, such as industry 
associations, may also play a role in aggregating and analyzing information arising out 
Reform Undertakings.208  Regardless, effective use of the information requires 
prosecutors and enforcement staffers to utilize greater data management skills than they 
have traditionally been required to use.  In particular, those working with the data will 
only be truly effective if they operate as flexibly as the Reform Undertaking participants 
themselves; taking a nuanced and evolving view of the best practices to emerge from 
various undertakings as opposed to relying solely on static checklists or established 
practices. 209   
 
B. Institutionalizing Reform 
For Reform Undertakings to produce sustainable change on widespread basis the 
learning processes they stimulate and the reforms they catalyze must be 
                                                 
207 Consider, e.g., the SEC’s Office of Risk Assessment.  The ORA was formed in 2004 “to help the SEC 
anticipate, identify, and manage risks.”  Information about the ORA on the SEC website is still sparse, 
however: see http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ora.htm. 
208 In addition to industry associations, other organizations, such as trade councils, public watchdogs like 
Transparency International, or nonprofits focused on compliance and ethics programs (supra note 194), 
may become involved.  In Sturm’s model, some combination of these groups and regulators could function 
collectively as “institutional intermediaries,” which she defines as those “public or quasi-public 
organizations that leverage their position within preexisting communities of practice to foster change and 
provide meaningful accountability.” Sturm, Architecture, supra note 197, at 251. Institutional 
intermediaries perform such functions as pooling knowledge, structuring collaborative relationships 
amongst various interested entities, developing accountability processes for the knowledge created, and 
supporting a community of scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers, to sustain the process of knowledge 
creation. Id. at 251, 280, 312-23. Although Sturm focused on one institutional intermediary performing all 
of these functions, multiple organizations working collaboratively could serve the same purpose.  
209 Other interested organizations, see supra note 208, may also play a role in articulating the “best 
practices” to emerge from Reform Undertakings.  On the relationship between third parties such as industry 
associations and trade councils, and regulators, with respect to reconciling a “best practices” approach 
within a “light touch” securities regulatory regime, see Cristie Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and 
Principles-Based Securities Regulation (forthcoming AM. BUS. L. J. 2007). 
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institutionalized.210  Even a Reform Undertaking’s multi-year destabilization exercise 
will not overcome self-serving organizational stasis if it fails to change the ground rules 
by which the organization operates.  This kind of institutionalization requires action by 
several different parties.   
Prosecutors and regulators must be prepared to engage in their own ongoing 
learning about, for example, best compliance practices so that they are credible in their 
interactions with corporations.  Just as importantly, prosecutors and enforcers must 
maintain a credible enforcement “stick” at the ready, and they must be prepared to 
respond to wrongdoing, including stonewalling in the course of a Reform Undertaking, 
quickly and effectively.  Such a hard-line approach reinforces the fact that the status quo 
is not an option.  Reform Undertakings should not be viewed as an all-purpose alternative 
to other available sanctions against corporations.  In addition, New Governance 
strategies, such as Reform Undertakings, do not have to, and should not, operate as a 
mutually exclusive alternative to traditional enforcement mechanisms.211  Rather, 
regulators and prosecutors should have at their disposal the full range of possible 
sanctions.  Reform Undertakings do not function primarily in terms of a deterrent 
                                                 
210 See Sturm, Architecture, supra note 197, at 299-301. 
211 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting 
as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471 (2004) (clearing up any misconception that 
New Governance means “soft law” and reiterating importance of enforceability).  There are very few actual 
instances in which a Reform Undertaking style monitor was appointed without the simultaneous imposition 
of fines, civil penalties, or a restitution order on a corporation.  The rare exceptions in the criminal context 
appear to be Aurora Foods, Inc, 2001, and Merrill Lynch, 2003.  See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 17, 
at 1745 & 1750. In practice, clearly, Reform Undertakings coexist with other sanctions.  This is not to 
suggest that most, or even any, Reform Undertaking settlement agreements reflect the idealized or “true” 
Reform Undertaking model.  However, even the “true” Reform Undertaking should be able to operate 
effectively in tandem with fines, restitution orders, individual penalties, and other sanctions. 
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capacity,212  but instead seek to address problems to which deterrence alone can provide 
only a partial and unpredictable response.213 Overall, Reform Undertakings should be 
viewed as embedded within the more traditional enforcement and prosecutorial 
functions.214   
The continual, active maintenance of the ethical culture must also be 
institutionalized within the corporation. The establishment of the necessary 
organizational hardware is not sufficient.215 The software of the corporation—which it 
should be noted is significantly less auditable for monitoring by external agents than a 
corporation’s hardware—must be actively managed and updated to handle the new risks 
the corporation faces as it enters new markets,  adjusts its strategies to remain 
competitive, and generally adapts to the changing business environment. For example, 
top management must ensure that employees appropriately perceive their demonstrations 
of ethical leadership and that norms of open communication on ethical issues are not 
eviscerated by the demands of short-term profitability.216 In short, “functional 
disobedience” must be allowed to flourish and new employees must be socialized into 
positive organizational values and not into routinized corruption. 
                                                 
212 But see Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 17, at 1727-31 (describing corporate monitors as a deterrence 
mechanism and comparing their use to cash penalties) 
213 See supra Part III.B; see also Ford, supra note 23, at 766-74 (discussing the limits of deterrence-based 
approaches in addressing corporate cultural problems). 
214 The continuing specter of sanctions means that there will be costs at the margins. That is, the Reform 
Undertaking process may not be characterized by dialogue as free as would take place without any coercive 
“stick” in the background.  But while trust is important to dialogue, Reform Undertakings do not require a 
level of mutual trust and open-ended dialogue between a corporation and a Third Party that is impossible in 
the enforcement/prosecutorial context.  cf Mark Tushnet, Governance and American Political 
Development, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 381 (Graínne de Burca & Joanne 
Scott, eds., 2006).  On the contrary, Reform Undertakings open up a space that would not otherwise exist 
within the enforcement superstructure. It is within this space that there is the best chance of having the type 
of dialogue that necessary to sufficiently address corporate culture problems. 
215 See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text. 
216 See supra notes 131-42 and accompanying text. 
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To create an environment in which the corporation no longer needs the Reform 
Undertaking to further its own compliance progress and solve its organizational culture 
problems, requires a broader reorientation.  To this end, Third Parties and all participants 
in the Reform Undertaking process should remain alive to the new strategic alliances that 
emerge from its dialogic process. Third Party should also take steps to entrench and 
encourage these alliances where they further law-abiding or “watchdog” behavior.  
Working in concert increases each party’s capacity to effect change.217  The multiple 
stakeholder groups that determine the content of the corporation’s broader “license to 
operate” also play a key role.218  No prosecutorial or enforcement action on its own can 
achieve meaningful reform if it operates in isolation from, or in opposition to, the larger 
law-favoring forces at work on the corporation.219  The Reform Undertaking is an 
important prosecutorial and enforcement tool not only for its processes during its active 
term, but especially for the ongoing reformative process that it has the potential to 
catalyze into the future. 
 
                                                 
217 See Hess, supra note 80, at 1812-14 (discussing the potential role of intermediary groups in improving 
the use of integrity-based compliance and ethics programs) 
218 Gunningham et al., supra note 21, at 329-39. 
219 For example, in examining when financial executives would actually use their company’s code of ethics 
in strategic decision making, Stevens and colleagues found that regulatory pressure was insignificant. John 
M. Stevens et al., Symbolic or Substantive Document? The Influence of Ethics Codes on Financial 
Executives’ Decisions, 26 STRAT. MGMT. J. 181, 188 (2005).   Instead, significant factors included market 
pressure (such as from shareholders, customers, suppliers, and banks) and the need to develop a positive 
corporate image for stakeholders generally. Id. at 188-90.  
 56 
V. Conclusion 
Over the past decade the problem of corruption has finally started receiving the 
attention it deserves from policy makers.220 Over the past few years the Securities 
Exchange Commission and Department of Justice have finally started making serious 
efforts at enforcing the United States’ anti-bribery laws against corporations.221 These 
efforts will not be effective against the worst offenders, however, if they do not address 
the issue of corporate ethical culture. Over time, the use of improper payments can 
become embedded in a corporation’s culture and its day-to-day routines. The 
organizational actors treat payments of bribes, or the use of agents the company suspects 
of paying bribes, solely as economic issues and not as legal and ethical issues. Through 
the DOJ’s use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements and the SEC’s use 
of settlement agreements, these agencies are attempting to address these root causes of 
corruption in many corporations. These agreements typically require corporations to 
adopt more effective compliance programs and to retain independent corporate monitors 
to oversee the implementation process.  
This article analyzed the potential effectiveness of these agreements through a 
New Governance perspective and developed the idea of a Reform Undertaking. Based on 
the essential features for effectiveness that this article identified, Reform Undertakings 
have a lot in common with the currently used deferred prosecution agreements and SEC 
settlements, but there are also significant differences. Of primary importance is the role 
of the third party independent monitor. This Third Party should serve not as a simple 
                                                 
220 Hess & Dunfee, Fighting Corruption, supra note 24, at 600 (quoting the president of the World Bank as 
stating in September 1997, “Only 18 months ago, the word corruption was never mentioned. Today, there 
is a publicly expressed revulsion, on moral, on social, and on economic grounds.”). 
221 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
 57 
monitor or as an all-powerful czar,222 but must take on facilitating and problem solving 
roles. These are roles which require significantly different sets of skills and 
characteristics than someone serving a monitoring role or a czar role. Overall, through the 
use of a New Governance perspective, this article identified essential features of Reform 
Undertakings that can more effectively tackle the root cause of persistent corrupt 
behavior by corporations—the corporation’s ethical culture—than alternative regulatory 
mechanisms.  
                                                 
222 Khanna and Dickenson, supra note 17, at 1727. 
